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§ 1. lntroduction
Ehrenfels' principal writings on value theory belong to the early
period of his creative life. their publication following immediately 
upon that of his classic paper "Über 'Gestaltqualitäten"'. They are:1 
- "Werttheorie und Ethik", a series of five articles published in
1893-94;
- "Von der Wertdefinition zum Motivationsgesetze", published
in the Archiv für systematische Philosophie in 1896;
- "The Ethical Theory of Value", a revi!!W of Meinong's Psycho­
logisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie, published in the
International Journal of Ethics in 1896;
and: 
- System der Werttheorie, vol. I: Al/gemeine Werttheorie, Psycho­
logie des Begehrens (1897) and vol. II: Grundzüge einer Ethik
(1898).
All of these writings are now collected, with othcr, supplementary 
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material, in vol. I of Reinhard Fabian's edition of Ehrenfels' 
Philosophische Schriften. I shall refer principally to the System der 
Werttheorie, citing page numbers according to the Fabian edition. 
What follows is intended as no more than an outline of Ehrenfels' 
views, with some reference to the relations between his work and the 
subjectivist approach to economic values initiated by Carl Menger in 
his Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre in 1871. All criticism will be 
spared, as also will detailed considerations of influence. 1 1 shall 
concentrate exclusively on value theory in the strict sense as Ehrenfels 
conceived it, avoiding conjecturcs as to the ways in which this theory 
rnight be supplemented by ideas from the theory of Gestalten to 
produce an account which would be more adequate to the dimension 
of aesthetic value.2 
§2. Foundations of a General Theory of Values
Menger founded what has since corne to be known as the "first"
Austrian school of valuc theory. The first-generation members of this
school included also Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk and Friedrich von
Wieser, with both of whom Ehrenfels had significant exchanges. 3 The
school is today represented by. arnong others, F.A. von Hayek,
Ludwig Lachmann and I.M. Kirzner, and passing mention will be
rnade in§ 10 below of possible lines of comparison between Ehrenfels'
thought and that of Hayek, in particular.
Ehrenfels, on the other hand, together with Meinong and other
pupils of Brentano. belonged to the "second" Austrian school of
value theory: In contradistinction to the economists, the members of
this school were concerned to develop a genera/ theory of values.
They regarded economic value as only one special sort of human
value. and urged that economic values could be properly undetstood
only when their connection with the entire range of value-phenomena
had been made clear.
1. For discussions of influences on Ehrenfels' value theory see Eaton,
Grassl, 1982a, and Fabian-Simons. 
2. The reader is however invited to cornpare the conception of value as
organic unity set forth by Nozick in ch.5 of his 1981 with ideas sketched by 
Ehrenfels, e.g. in the fragment "Höhe und Reinheit der Gestalt" (1916). 
3. Grass!, op.cit. is now the definitive survey of these exchanges.
4. See Eaton and, 011 the wider membership and influence of the schooi,
Grassl, 1981 and (forthcoming). 
From: R. Fabian (ed.), Christian von Ehrenfels: Leben und Werk. 
Amsterdam: Rodopi,  (l986), l50-l71l 
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The rnembers of th i s  second school d id however look u p  to the  
econom i st s  a s  hav ing ach ieved a theoret ica l  depth  a nd rigour i n  the i r 
a na l yses wh ich  was a t  that t ime lack ing  i n  work on va l ues on the part 
of the ir  fe l l ow ph i l osophers .  Eth ics ,  in part icular, Ehrenfels 
concei ved as having ha rdly advanced beyond i t s  beginn ings with the 
Greeks :  
i t  se ts a s  i t s  goa l .  . .  an ex t ra neous and often a rb i t rary hst i ng :md rank ing of 
e t h ica l a nd other  va l ue -objcc t s ,  from which one might  a t  best glean thost: 
fe..,..,ons in her i ted from past ages wh ich  we ,·a l l  "world l y  wisdom" •·­
somet h ing which we norma l ly  learn t o  unders tand 1 0  apprec ia te on ly when 
we have acqu i red i t  for ou rsclves and a t  our own cost (p . 2 1 4f. ). 
But how is t he desi red 1heore1ical understanding of va lues to be 
a ch ieved? Here Eh rcnf e l s  tu rned on the one hand to t he task of 
generalising l aws of va l ua t 1on wh 1ch had been d iscovered by the  
econom i st c; .  above a l l  thc  iaw of margi nal u t ih ty .  And on the  other  
band hc turned to psyd1ology .  Th is he  conceived . wi th  some 
d i ffe rcnces, i n  ihe wa y Bren tano conce i ved i t  in the Psychologie vom 
empiriJchcn 5itandpunk t .  Li! . as a descripr ive psychology of d i fferen t  
k i nds of ac t s  and of  i n terre la t ions be twel:"n acts .  These two strands in  
Ehrenfrls '  work and i ndecd i n  the  work of  �'h:i nong, whe> mus r  be 
c red itcd wi th  h a vi ng  taken the fi rs t s teps m th i s  d i n:-ct iotL support 
eac: h  o ther  mu t ua l l y :  t h e  sa me laws ho ld for moral  va iues as for 
econormc va l ues because thc two sor!.S of values have the same 
p.syrhological foundations.
§3 .  The Rela t ion bet ween Des i re a nd Fee l i ng
Ehienf els' psychological founda t ion  of va iue-theory conceives the  
va lue of th i ngs as dependent upon human val u i ng act s ,  which a re in 
t u rn wncei ved as being dcpendent upon acts of desi re .  Thus, at least 
i n  fi rst approximat ion , 
5. The most impor ta n t  d i ffe rence , from our present poi n t  of view, is the
sha rp  d i st inct ion d rawn by Eh renfe l s  between the two categories offeeling 
and desire. These were run together by Bren tano into t he single ca tegory of 
'phenomena of love a nd ha te ' .  Brentano is c rit icised on th is poin t  also by 
Anscombe in her 1 978. l t  is t he common indebtedness to a Brentanian act­
psychology which , more tha n  anyth ing e ise .  makes i t  appropriate to regard 
Ehrenfel s .  Meinong , K raus ,  K reibig and others as members of a single 
school . 
• 
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we do  no t  des i re thi ngs beca use we  grnsp in t h em some myst icaL 
i ncomprehens ible essence "va iue" ;  ra ther ,  we a scribe "val ue" to th ings 
beca use we desi re them (p . 2 1 9 ). 
Of cou rse the i mmedia te  suspic ion awakened by a view of th i s  k ind 
i s  t ha t ,  i n  spite of the detour t h rough des ire .  i t  must amount to some 
form of hedon i sm , i .e .  to the view tha t  the value of an  object is 
u l t imate l y  a ma t t e r  of the pleasure (f ee i i ng) it wil l bring. But
Eh renfe ls  is not a hedon i s t :  h e  does not hold that one's own fee! ings
const i tme the u ! t ima te goa l of a l l  des i r ing .  To see why not , it i s
necessary to mention briefl y  h i s  account  of  the  re la t ionsh ip  between
desi re a nd presenta t ion .  Desi re is d i rccted towards some des ired
objec;t ( the word 'objec t ' ,  hcre , bei np: understood in the  widest
poss ib le sense , to includr a l so prnperties , re la t ions ,  prncesscs ,  etc . ) .
And th i s  desi red object , according ro  Ehrenfe ! s ,  rnust be presented i n
some wa y by  he who des ires i t .  Seme 1dea of  i t  mus t  be presen t  a s  a
const i t uen t  of the  act of des i re .  The question ol hedon i sm amounts ,
t herefore . to t he quest ion whether ,  when we des i r-: ,  we a lso necessa r i ­
l y  present to  ourse lves ou r own pkasure or our  own pai n ,  or the
remova l of the same .  And the a nswer to this quest 1on is that i n  many
cases we do .  bu t  not in  a/J.
This is the ca se fi rst of a l l  beca use :  
i n  t h e  most common c i rc umstances of ou r  everyday l ife ou r  dcs ir ing goes 
d i rec t l y  ro ce rt a i n  rout ine external tasks such as ea t i ng .  drink ing, wai t ing ,  
s i t t i ng , sieepi ng .  e tc . ,  w 1 thout  therc bci ng presented thereby t he s ta te of 
fee l i ng which corresponds to these tasks (p .236) 
- a poi n t  wh ich a n t ic i pates the importan t  role played by habit i n
Eh renfe l s '  theory, to  be  d i scussed in  § 10 below.
And i t  i s  the case , secondly ,  because some desires re late to periods 
of t ime of wh ich the subject wi l l  not  or could not have experience , or 
to the f eel i ngs of i nd i vidua l s  wi th whom he cou!d have no con• 
cei vab le  contact . I m igh t ,  for example ,  desi re that my remote 
descenda nts  shou ld have the opportun i ty  to  acquire a taste for 
oysters: or I m igh t  wish that  the Spanish Inquis i t ion had never ta ken 
place ; a nd a range of other cases can be brough t forward to 
demonstrate tha t  the concept of an act which i s  d irected towards 
goa ls other than one's  own feel ings does not conta i n  any sort of 
con t radiction .6 
6. Complement.a ry a rguments to t he same effect a re to be found i n
Duncker, 1 94 1 .
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Wh i ls t  t he des i ring subject does not i n  every case desire h i s  own 
happi ness , there is  of course some re lat ion between desi re and 
ha ppmess or. more genera l l y ,  between des i re and feeling. But this 
re la t ion is  a complex one, involving both the dispositions of the given 
individua l a nd the relat ive promotion of ha ppiness which he expe­
riences as being associa ted wit h given acts .  
We can say,  very roughly, that the disposi t ion to desi re on the part 
of a g iven  indi vidual i s  dependent  upon the  d 1 sposi t 10ns of that 
i nd i vidua l to have certa i n  feeli ngs. To say more than t h is .  we have to 
recogn i se tha t  ac t s  of desi re , according to Ehrenfets, a re d ivided i n to 
three categories of wish ing ,  str i vi ng, and w i l l i ng .  These th ree ca te­
gori es a re ordered by the i n tensi t y  of t he experienced tendency i n  
each to e xe rt a causa l  infl uence on  the surround ings of the  subj�c t i n  
such a wa y a s  to  bri ng abouc the desired object .  The y a re rela ted aiso 
i n  such a wa y tha t ,  j ust as every desire incorpora tes a presen tation of 
the desi red object ,  so every strivi ng incorpora tes a wishing and every 
w i l l ing i ncorporates a striving (p .367f; sec also Ehrenfels ,  1 887). 7 In
re lat ion to the la t ter  pai r ,  now, the re holds what Eh renfels cal ls the 
/aw of the relative promotion of happine.u ! Gesetz der relativen 
Glücksförderung] : 
Eve ry a-: t of s t riv ing or wi l l i n!! ,  a i  the t ime a t  which i t  ta kes place , 
fu rthers the state of happi ness (of the desi ri ng subject] in comparison 
wi t h  that s ta te whi<.: h  would have obta i ned in the case of t he abscnce of 
t he gi ven act (p . 2 39 ) .  
Or more preci se ly :  
Every ac t  of des i ring i s  condit ioned . bo th i n  i ts goa l  a nd in i ts mtensity, 
by  the rela t i ve promotion of happiness which i t  brings - in the l ight of 
the fee l ing-<füposit ions of the ind ividua l  in quest ion - at i t s  time of entry 
into t he consciousness of this individual and du ring the time it remains 
there in (p .245) .  
Th is (relat ive) increase i n  happiness is of course not i tself some­
th i ng which is aimed at: th i s  would bring us back to a form of 
hedonism ,  Rather. the law e xpresses one aspect of a compiex relation 
of dependence i n vo lving di sposi tional propert ies of an  ind ividual ,  in 
something l i ke the way in  which the law of marginal ut i l i ty ,  which 
7 .  I n  Brentano's termino iogy, a presentation is an inseparable part of 
every desire , a wishing is an inse parable pa rt of every st rivi ng, and so on. Cf. 
Mu l l igan/Sm i t h .  1 985 .  
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a sserts that the re is  a tendency fo r  the u t i l i t y  deri ved frnm a good to 
decrease with an  increase in its supp ly ,  e xpresses one aspect of a 
complex re lat ion of dependence i nvolvi ng the <lisposi tiona l  prope r� 
ties of a good to yie ld u t i l ity. 
Note , too , that i t  would be unreasonable to assert any law of 
absolute i ncrease in happiness .  One might , for exampie , do con­
t i n uous bat t le  against  an evi l (for exampie i l l-hea l th) ,  which is  
neverthe iess cont i nuai l y  worseni ng , and st i l l  be a lways relatively 
happier than one would otherwise have been .  It i s  necessary, for 
given acts of s tri ving a nd wi l l i ng to take place, only that, should one 
have been condem ned to absta i n  from them , one would have been 
st i l l  more unhappy . 
§4, ll1e Objects of Desi re
The propos i t ion tha t  we a sc: ribe va l ue to th i ngs because wc des i re 
them was , we said , a fi rs t approxima t ion . For there a re th i ngs to 
wh ich we a sc ribe value wi thout  our  be i ng able to desi re them . Thus 
for e xa m ple I ca nnot desi re the possession of a materiai good which I 
a l ready possess ,  yet I can perfec t l y  wel !  ascribe value to this good . 
Si m i la rl y .  I cannot des : re that I be al i ve ,  and yet I place a va lue on my 
being i n  th is  state , Ehrenfe l s  expresses this point in a way which is a t  
fir s t  paradoxica i .  He sa ys tha t  i t  i s  on ly  of  th ings which do not exist 
that  we can say that they have va lue a t  al l .  Of other things we have to 
say strictl y speaking that they would have va lue if they did not exist 
(p .252). A better approximation to a 'law of value' is then : 
We ascribe val ue to those th i ngs which we either in fac t  desire ,  or which 
we would desire if we were not convinced of thei r existence . The va l ue of 
a th ing i s  its desi rabi l i ty . . .  The st ronger we desi re or would desire an 
object ,  the higher val ue does that object possess for us (p.253). 
Some of the a i r of paradox i s  removed from such formulations 
when Eh renfels points out tha t ,  whi lst there is , certainly, a way of 
speak ing according to which we desire material things, processes, 
states (e.g. states of m ind) ,  and even relat ionships and possibilities, 
our desi ri ngs and valuings never relate d i rectly to the object , but 
a lways to its existence or non-existence (or, more generally, to our 
owning or losing it, to our being i n  or lacking control of i t ,  to our 
consuming or fa i l ing to consume i t ,  and so on , i .e , to what, in the 
jargon , i s  cal led a Sachverhalt or stare of affairs): 
r.· ... . . .. " ·' 
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To des i re a n  object is to dcsi re e i ther the exis tence of the th ing or i ts
possessi on .  a nd then i n  the lat ter case the desire a lso re lates to an
e x i ,tence .  not of thc th ing i t sc lf, bu t  of our  power of d i spos ing over l t ,
a nd a i  the �ame t ime i t  is d i rected to a non-existence : the absencc of  a l l
d i s t urbam:es wh i ch  wou!d inh ib i t  t h i �  power of  d i sposa l .  S im i l a rly we
des i re ! he  exis tence or non ·-ex i s tence , or more pa r t i cu larl y the occurrence
or non -occurrence ,  of certa in  changes of place , processes, or sta tes , . . .
! p . 254 ) .
Note tha t  'e x is tence ' ,  here ,  i s  not a n  abstract not ion,  as i t  i s ,  for
e xa mple , i n  t he ontology of Meinong. ( Ehrenfe l s '  problems are not
a bs t racL bu t  pe rha ps the most concrete t ha t  there a re . )  For he ins ists
t ha t  the presen ta t ion of ex is tence o r  non-ex i s tence wh ich i s  invo!ved
m an ac t  of desi re a lways re la tes in some wa y to ex i s tence with in  t h c
ca usa l o rder to  which the  subject cxperiences h imse !f  a l so  a s  be­
long.mg .
The re i s  no spec ia l  psychic basic-ekmen t · ·ctesi r111g · ·  (w , sh ing .  sr.ri 1; ing,
wi ! i ini ) .  Wha t wc ca ! i  dcsir i ng i s  a l ways noth i ng o t lie r than ihc presenta­
t ion .  foundm,I! a n: la t i ve promo t 1 cn of happmess , of t lw mcl usion or
exc! us1 0n of an objrct rn or fn�m the causa l  nc• 1work a round thc ctnt rt' of
the  prcsen t  .:•• r: . :re1e ;-prc,en ta t :on ( p . 3R6) .
We cm now �,ec: i h a t  t he rema rk t ha t  w i sh ing , s t r i vi n g  a nd wi ! ! i ng
rtpresen i  d iffe rent  orders of e xpe r ie nced causa l  i nvolveme n t  of t h e
de smng s ;.1bwct  a ppl ie '; ,  more prec ise l y ,  t o  the ways i n  wh i ch  t he
s�i bJCct 's own an ion:-.  a n.' pn:sen ted by h im  as  a s soci a ted wi th  t bi s
p resen t a t ion  of a n  mc ius ion o r  exc ius ion of the  ob.1ec t  of des i rc wi t h i n
th 1 s  causa l  ne twork .. Th 1 s  assoc ia r ion  i s  most a t tenua ted i n  the case of
t lw w i sh ,  yet even here t hc re is some residua l  causa l  1nvolvernen t :
however h igh ly  w t  m igh t  va ! ue 1 he repl ica t ion  o f  events o f  a g iven
sort , we  do no t  w 1 sh tha t s uch even ! s  shou ld t ake  pla<.:e i n  para l le l
un i verses wi lh which we could have no possible ca usai contact .8
Tha l  t he object of des ire is a lwa ys presented as  set ca usa l ly i n
rela t i on to  t h e  surrounding rea l i ty  o f  t h e  subject i s  c lea r where the
objcct of desi re is  a fu t u re s tate of the seif (an effect of what he
h imself w i l l  do).  But  Eh renfels i n sis ts  that even  i n  rcgard to far  dis tan t
past  or fu ture t i mes, for example if  I dcsire t ha t  Socra tes  had been
acqui t ted , or t ha t  Beethoven had heard his  9th Symphony. then I
ß. �t is _cons\derations such as thi s ,  perhaps ,  wh ich would e xplain thepccuhar a1r of unrca\\ty wh ich surrnunds the d ream-machine experiments•��cn of by Robert No1.ick in his 1 974 .
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present these processes as brought i nto causa l  connection with thi ngs,
proccsses and events wh ich I regard as reaL I cGns1der the g1ven
processes a lways
either as co-determ in ing ca uses of presen t  rea l i t ies in which I ,  wo . a m
involved (a� in the two g iven cases.) o r  as effccts o f  shared causes , o r  a s
poss ib le sha rcd causes of fu t ure effects. a l l  unders tood a s  rda ted t o  rn y
present  surrounding rea i i ty ( in bezug ,rnf die gegenwärtige subjektive 
Wirklichkeit! (p . 266).
This  moment of ca usal involvernen t  i s  retlecm.l in  the way i n  wh 1ch
de:-. i r e  ha� a rea l 'muscu lar '  effrct on one 's body, the way i n  which
object!> of des1 n' ,  as soon as we des i re them ,  'cease to  fioat a ro und as
::rn- i nsubstant ia l p !ay of l ight a nd shadow in  the region of phantasy -­
and wi n ,  a s  i t  were , embodie<lness a nd weight '  {p . 366).
§ 5 .  On the Nat ure of Va! ues
Ehrenfe l s  d i smisses out of hand anempts , such as the Marxi a n
l abour theory ,  to a n s  wer t he q uest ion a s  t o  the nawre o f  va l ue  b y
appea l t o  not iuns i ikc  cost o r  sacnfice .  Ccrta in iy  l may dcc1dc 
prac t i ca ! l y  wh Kh of two objeus i:,, mor<" va l uable to me by askmg
mysel f for which objec i i would be prcpared to  make thc greater
-;a�r i fice ( oav  the b igher p ricc ) .  Bur th is ,  a s  Eh renfels poin t s  out .  i s
noth mg n�o;e tha n a usl!fu l pract ica l  exped ien t. l t  has no theoretica l
consequences:
it couid neve r  hclp to rhrow ! i�ht on the content of the concept of value ,
s i !'lce of co11 rse it consists just in measuring one va l ue aga inst another,
more specifica ! ly  i n  measuring a posi t i ve agains l  a negat ive value (p. 267) .
The trad ition of Austrian phi losophy to which Ehrenfels belonged
sough t not to reduce one sort of object to another, but rather to
describe as faithfully as poss ible ou r  experiences of given objects and
to describe the  in terconnections between them i n  such a way as to
a llow these descri ptions to t h row ligh t on quest ions as to the i r  nature
a nd mode of cx istence . In regard to va ! ues .  Eh renfels points out that
t hey cannot be propert ies , disposi t ions or capac i t ies of object s ,  for
t hen thei r ex i s tence would be bound up with the existence of the
ob jects involved .  S uch a conception would imply ,  for instance , tha t
t h� val ue of the  v ic tory of the Normans i n  1 066 , for exampl e for
present-day Frenchmen ,  ceased to exist i n  l 066. Value 1s ,  ra the r ,
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accord ing to Ehrenfe l s ,  a certai n smt of intentional relation between a 
subject and an  object .  lt is an i n tent ional rela t ion beca use i ts
obta in ing does not depend upon the s imultaneous existence of the
two rela ta .  In th is  respect i t  is comparable to  the reia t ion between
presenta t ion and presented object , or between judgment and object
judged abou t ,  but it i s  cornpa rable a lso to re la t ions such as s imi lari ty
and d i fference .9 And a l l  of t hese re la t ions ,  Eh renfe ls  a rgues ,  can be
awa rded a k i nd of ' supe rtem poral  ex i s tence' (p .26 1 ) . 1 0 
The re la t ion of va lue consis ts i n  the fact that ' the subject e i ther
act ua l l y  desi res the object or would desi re i t  were hc not con v inced of
its e xi s t ence ' {loc . c i t . ) . Th i s  re l a tion exists 
whereve r the most i n tu i t i ve, v iv id a nd complele presenta t ion of the
ex i stence of the givcn object condi t ions in the subject a state which lies
h igher on the feel i ng-sca le plcasure-displeasure than t he correspondi ng
presen ta t ion of mat ters g iven the non-exi stence of t hc objecL Thc
magni t ude of t he va l ue i s  proport i onal to the in tensi t y  of the desire, as
a lso t o  the dis ta nce between the two feel i ng-sta tes so characte rised
( locc i t .  l .  
Th us va l ue is  ·subjec t i ve '  in the two-fold sense that i t  depends for its
ex i s tence on a spec ific  v a l u i ng subject and for i t s  i nterna l const i tut ion
(i n t ensi t y  a nd d i rectedness) upon the  d i sposit ions of that  s ubJect . I t
i s ,  however ,  'e rroneous ly  object i fied by ianguage ' (p . 3 1 ) . Value is not ,
be i t  noted , he reby reduced to disposi tions to feel ing .  For va l ue is  not 
an  a u tomai lc reflect ion of fee l i ng-d1spositions ,  as if we couJd read off
the va lue a th ing wou ld ha ve for each given subject from a k nowledge
of the way that subject is d isposed to feel .  Value rela tes to feeli ng
a lwa ys t h rough the media t ion of desire , and thi s in troduces an
element of vol un tarism in to the accoun t .  The presence of this element
reflects the fact  t ha t .  a t  least in certa in circumstances , des ire must
come i n  advance of assoc ia ted feel ing ,  and this in turn has grea t
significa nce for Ehrenfels' conception of the motor of human evolu•
t ion , which he seems to conceive a s  a spec ies of excess energy of
desi re .  
9 .  Th e  confusion, o r  at  least the terminologica l running together of
in ten tional and formal  rela t ions is characterist ic of early Brentanians,
inc luding Husserl . 
IO .  On relational theories of value i n  genera l  see Ingarden ,  1 984 .
� \ .
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§6. Types of Val ues
[ may desire something eiiher for its own sake , or beca use of the
effects which I conceive i t  as having  in bringing about something
wh ich I desire for its own sake. This yields for Ehrenfeis a division
into intrinsic values [Eigenwerte] and ejfect  values ( Wirkungswerte} . 1 1  
On the other hand , a n  object may have intrinsic value for me only
in vi r tue of the val ue of some part or rnoment .  Eh renfels gives the
e xample of the in tri nsic value of a man in virtue of his good
character. The va lue of the good character Ehrenfels cal ls an
immediate va lue. 1 2  The value of the man he cai l s  a constitulive value
(compare the va l ue typology represented be)ow ) .  An exampie of a
mixed const i tu t i ve and effect va lue would be the value of a piece of
ore i n  v i rt u e  of t hai pa rt üf it which is i ron , wh ich is i n  turn valued
beca use of the eff ects of its use in pa rt icular applica t ions. But note
that  the piece of  ore may also - for example in reflec t ion of its
beau ty  -· have val ue for i t s  own sake .  Th is  shows that even the
posi t ion of ob3ects in the va ! ue typology is  in part context- and
subject-dependent . One and the same object can i n  one context have
an in t rinsic value , in another merel y an cffect va!ue ,  and in another it
may have no value at all . 
,Value 
/'/ 
' '
/ ........._____ 
/ '-----. d. ,, me 1ate �
/ / \  '�, 
immediate pu rely / purely mixed
'-., constitutive cau sal /
� / \ ./ ' / ' / intrinsic effect 
values values
(from p. 269 of System der Werttheorie. )
1 1 . Menger's theory of capital divides effect values in turn into effect
values of first order ,  which yield intrinsic value directly, effect va lues of
second order, which yield effect values of fi rst order, and so on. 
1 2 . l t  a ttaches to i t s  object 'immediately '  in the sense of Husserl (Logical
lnvestiga t ion I I I ,  § 1 8). 
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The const i tu t i ve va lue of a whole is simp ly  the sum of the 
i m med i a te va l ues of the pa ns .  The effect va l ue of a whole , i n  
con t ras l , i s  norma l l y  not si m p!y the s u m  o f  the va l ues o f  t h e  part s .  
(Cons ider  the respec t i ve effect va l ues of  two pa i rs of shoes , one a 
norma l  pa i r ,  t h e  o ther  a pai r cons is t ing of two - independent l y 
perhaps more va l ua ble - !eft shoes .) Th is non-summat ive character 
of effec t va l ues retlects what t he Austr ian econom i sts ca l led 'com­
plemen t a r i t y '  a mongst materia l  and other resou rces ,  and eh .  VII of 
Pa rt I of System der Wert theorie , "On t he C'a lcu lat ion of Effec t 
Va l ue s" .  i s  i n  essence an  exposi t ion of the main  out l i nes of the 
Au s t ri an  economic  theory of complernenta r i ty  a nd of t he associa ted 
not ions  of impu t a t ion and  subst i t u t i on .  Wi t h  rega rd to t hese las t , 
bot h Me nge r a nd Ehren fe l s  sha re the view tha t  we assign effect va lues 
to  ob_ject s to the ex t en t  that we bel ieve in t ri n s ic va lues to be 
dependent  upon the i r  ex i stence (p . 3 1 ). (The proposi t i on tha t  the 
va l ue of goods of h igher order  i s  dcri vcd sole ly from the va l ue of the 
consumer  goods in whose rnan ufac tu re they serve has i ndeed come to 
be ca l l ed ' Menge r 's  law' by present-day proponents of A ustrian 
econom ics . )  The prob lem of ' impu ta t ion'  i s  just  t he problem of 
ca lcula t i ng  effect val ues g i ven  this dependence on in t rins i c  va l ues .  
( How, i n  a complex p rocess of p rod uct ion of some consumer good , i s  
t he va l ue of the  fac tors u sed i n  th i s  process to be irnpu ted from the  
va l u e  for consumers of  the  expected end-product?) Cen t ra l  to the 
econom i s t s '  sol u t ion  to th i s  problem , and also to  Eh renfe l s '  account ,  
i s  the  not ion  of  subst i t u tabi l i t y ,  the idea  tha t  the  magn i t ude of an  
eff ec t  va l ue i s  t he cost of substi t u t i ng some o the r  means  of bringing 
about the same effect . The va l ue of the wa ter on board a sh ip  i s  the 
cost of a detour to  rep len i sh stocks, and this changes, from day to 
day, with t he d i s ta nce from the nearest port . 
Effec t va l ues ,  for Eh renfe l s ,  d i vide into materia l  goods on the one 
hand and h uman be i ngs (or more par t icu lar ly  'human act ions and 
qua l i t ies' ) on the o ther, The former  he  concei ves as the  subject-mat ter 
of economics , t he la t ter fal l  wi t h in  the doma in  of e th ics , though of 
course human beings, too, can be t reated as mate ria l goods ,  for 
ex�m�le when they a re used as s laves (p . 399) .  But t h i s  ifT)pl ies a 
reJec t 1on of the  more usua l  c lass ifications of the sciences of val ues :  
for now econom ics a nd e th ics , conceived a s  sciences of effect value<; 
sta nd over  aga i n s t ,  for e xa rn pl e ,  aest hetics, logic ,  med ic ine ,  hygiene :  
a nd other d i sc i pl i nes deal ing wi th i n t rins ic  va lues : 
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Art , science , hea l th  - when these word s are understood i n  a part icular 
way - al l belong to that g rea t comple x of in t ri nsic va l ues which lend 
ex i s tence to effect va l ues not  only i n  the economic but  a lso in the ethical 
sphe re (p .400). 
§7. What Doth Chari ty Avail Me?
To solve the im putat ion problem , for example in order to decide
whether to spend one's fort une on re l igious or on po l i t ica l  pu rposes,
or on somc m ix ture of bot h ,  or  on wi ne , women, or song, i t  is
necessa ry that the i nd iv idual  va l u i ng subject have some impl ic i t
not ion of a common measure of the  i n t ri ns ic va l ues  wh ich might be
yie lded by resources at h i s  d i sposa l . Class ica l l y ,  the term 'u t i l i ty' has
been ernp loyed for this concep t ,  but Eh renfels fi nds this term too
na rrow. For someth ing i s  norma l l y  said to be of u t i l i t y  for a subject
on ly  to the t: x tent tha t  it l eads to a resu l t  wh ich is of intri nsic va luefor
him , i .e .  of i n t ri ns ic va lue i n  the  narrow, egoistic sense :
Thus ,  accord ing to common concept ions , t h e  money wh ich I g i ve out for my 
own p leasure is of  u t i l i t y :  not ,  however .  t ha t  wh ich I g ive to the begga r 
wh ich g i ves him u t i l i t y  ( p . 27 1 ) .  
In o rder to lea ve ' u t i l i ty '  wi t h  i ts  c us to rnary meaning we therefore 
i n t rod uce a s  a techn ica l term the word ' ava i l '  (a trans lat ion of 
Eh ren fe l s '  somewhat  a rcha i c  'Frommen ' ) .  By 'ava ir  i s  rnean t , qu i t e  
genera l l y ,  t h e  magni t udes of  i ntr insic va lues underlying effect va lues , 
so that  u t i l i t y  then appears as  a sub-c lass of ava i l .  Courage in battle, 
d u teous service in one's pa rish , honour, chari ty ,  loyalty ,  marriage , 
honesty, may a l l  be lack ing i n  u t i l i t y  for given i ndividuals i n  given 
c i rcumstances ;  but th i s  does not mean that they a re without avail.
Ehrenfe ls  even goes so far as to formulate a ' law of d imin ishing 
margina l  avai l '  (p . 274) ,  a nd in this he  is , with Böhm-Bawerk , one of 
t he fi rst to recogn ise the possib i l i ty  of genera l is ing the poin t  of view 
of economic t heory - in a way wh ich has  now become a lmost 
commonplace - to areas where it has h i t herto been held to be 
ent i re ly a l i en . 1 3 
1 3 . Cf. Böhm-Bawerk , 1 88 1 ,  Becker ,  McKenzie and,  for a genera l
i n t rod uc t ion ,  McKenzie-Tu l lock . 
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§ 8 .  ln te rpe rsona l Yal ue-Compa risons
A further prob lem for the genera l  theory of va l ues i s  that of
compa ri ng  or re l a t i ng the valuat ions of di fferen t  i nd ividuals .  One 
migh t ,  for e xample ,  reason that to affi rm tha t  M places more value 
on object A than  N ,  i s  to affirm that  M is ready to re l i nqu i sh more 
t han  N for the rea l i sa t ion of A .  Bu t  then of course we have no means 
of compa ring t hei r respec t ive va l ua t ions of what i t  i s  t h a t  each is  
prepared to sacrifice i n  order to at ta in the desi red goal . In  certain  
c i rcumsta nces we can appeal to some common sfandard . M migh t ,  
fo r e xamp le ,  b e  prepa red to sacrifice h i s  l i fe and en t i re fortune for 
some gi ven end , where N is prepared to offe r no  more than , say ,  an  
old ra incoa t .  And because , i n  t he  case of  va l ues such as l i fe ,  l iberty ,  
hea l th , the l i fe of one 's fami l y  and the l i ke ,  we can assume a fai r  
a mount  o f  un iform i ty  across a normal  populat ion , we can reasonably 
conc l ude in such c i rcums tances t ha t ,  o ther  th i ngs be ing equal , M's 
va l ua t ion  i s  t he h i gher. Bu t  a c lea r-c u t  concl usion of th is  sort wi l l  be 
avai lab le on l y  i n  re l a t i vel y rare c i rcumstances . 
Ehrenfe l s  t herefore considers a l so the possib i l i t y  of effecting an  
independen t compa rison of d i fferen t  subjects '  va l ua t ions by appeal  
to the i n tens i t ies of t he i r  respect ive acts of fee l i ng  and desire ,  that  the 
t wo types of comparison ma y se rve as  some sort of check on each 
othe r .  ln tens i t ies of fee l i ng  a nd desi re a re ,  after  a l l ,  correlated , at 
l eas t  to  somc exten t ,  w i th  phys io logical phenomena which can be 
measurcd . He notes, however ,  that the comparison of such absolute 
i n tensi t ies does not y ie ld a va l id measure for val ue-comparison : 
For suppose the two subjects M and N are of a completely identical 
psychica l d i sposi t io n ,  wi t h  the si ngle e xception that al l  feel ing reactions 
in M a re one and a half t imes more i n tens ive than i n  N. In this case M and 
N would behave id ent ica l l y  in all iden tica l  si t uat ions; indeed one would 
have no means a t  a l l ,  and no clue, as to how to ident ify the difference in 
the i r  fee l i ng-react ions or even to presume that there i s  such a d i fference . . .  
l f  t wo subjects behave iden tica l l y  in a l l  conceivable cases o f  conflict ,  then 
they a l so va lue ident ica l l y  (p . 282f. ). 
In the comparison of the valuat ions of d i fferent subjects what matters 
is, t herefore , the direction and the relative intensit ies of the decisions 
of thei r wi l l  and of the i r  impulses to act ion ,  not the absolute 
i n tensi t ies of the i r  feel i ng states .  
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§9 . Thc Struggle for Existence among Va lues
Yalues a re ,  a s  we havc see n ,  in every case relat ive to va lu ing
subject s .  and si nce there is  compet i t ion amongst those subjects for
va l ued objects of various types ,  so, deri va t ive ly ,  there arises a
compet i t ion amongst values themselves .  lt i s  as if the  ma terial of
value were itself a scarce resource , and subject to a l l  of the char­
acte ri st ics of sca rce resources , i nc luding the l iabi l i ty to degenerate
th rough overuse or to be used up. and to be aff ec ted e .g .  by c l i mat ic
or technological change or by growth i n  knowledge .
Ehrenfel s is aware that h i s  account of thc mechanisms govern ing
va lue-change may suggest certa in  para l l e l s  wi th  the materia l i s t
i n te rpretat ion of h i story. But the la t ter  goes too fa r ,  he c la ims ,  in
see ing the superstructura l  d imension of val ue as be ing determ ined
exhaust ive ly by  u nderl ying ma teri al deve lopments .  His accoun t ,  i n
contrast , sees a comple x system o f  dependence re la t ions between
disposi t ions and  tendencies on the two levels in such  a way as to leave
room for even large-sca le consequences of i ndividual acts , inc luding
somet imes gra tu i tous acts of des ire .
Cruc ia l  to  Ehrenfe ls '  account  - wh ich suggests a l so  a comparison
with Nietzsche - is his bel ief that in trinsic va lues ,  too , may changc .
Indeed Ehrenfel s cri t ic ises economics for concern ing itself with effect
va lues �xc l us ively u nder cond i t ions of stable in trinsic va l ues (p . 3 33) .
Change in i n t ri nsic va l ues i s  brought about above a l l  i n  response to
changes i n  effect va lues , and then the new in t rinsic va l ues ,
i n  ca l l ing forth new str i vi ngs on the  part of  h uman beings , transform the  
rela t ions of  man to man,  and therefore a l so transform for the  va luing 
ind ividual the c i rcumstances of h i s  su rrounding world ,  thereby setting in 
t ra in once more new mo1 ion in the effect val ues (loc.ci t . ) .  
Thus the i n tri nsic value which we , in Western countries ,  have late ly 
l ea rned to awa rd to 'se lf--deve lopment '  on the part  of women ,  reflects 
changes for  example i n  the effect val ues of home services (brought 
about by technological deve lopments in the fields of cooking and 
c leaning). l t  a lmest certa in ly  refl ec ts a lso changes i n  the effect val ues 
used up in generat ing 'se l f-deve lopment '  (as education , for example, 
has become cheaper,  re lat i ve to other goods). 
It i s  clear from all of this that there is  no trace , i n  Ehrenfels '  
th ink ing ,  of value-absolut i sm or va lue-object ivism such as we find in ,  
say ,  Plato, Meinong , Seheier, or N .  Hartmann (or  indeed , though 
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t hese a re pe rha ps to be ta ken less se riou s l y ,  i n  certa i n  protagonis ts of 
so-ca l l cd ' h uman  righ t s ' ) . 1 4
Nor ,  e i t h er ,  i s  there a trace o f  e th i ca l  formal i sm such a s  we fi nd i n  
t h e  'meta ph ysical -myst ica l dogmat ism ' o f  K a n t  (p . 2 1 5 ): the princ iple 
of un i versa l i sab i l i t y  Eh renfe l s  would reject a s  the resu l t  of an 
insens i t i v i t y  10  t he wa ys i n  wh ich even i n t ri n sic  va l ues may d i ffer 
from i nd i v id ua l  to  i nd i vid ual accordi ng  to  age , sex ,  or persona l 
d i s pos i t ion , e . g .  beca use of the  d i ffe rent reperto i re of effec t va l ues 
wh ich each wi l l  ha ve at h i s  d i sposa l . 
Eh renfe l s '  a pproach  to va l ues a lwa ys ma n i fes ts  a tota l respect for 
the ka le id ic  sh ift s  i n  the  to ta l i t y  of va l u e s ,  the motor of which he sees 
as a n  e xt raord i na ri l y  sub t le and  complex systcm of the most manifold 
e ffcc t s  a nd co unter-effect s ,  whe re 'one s tep d i s t u rbs a thousa nd 
lea ves '  ( p . 3 .B ) . Eh renfe l s '  views here a re not , howeve r ,  mere l y  a form 
of soc i a l  orga n ic i sm (a fasc i na t ion  w i t h  the b iomorphology of 
soc , e t y ) . The y  a re ,  ra t h e r ,  thc resu l t  of a theoret ica l  rccogn i t i on  of the 
1 rn portance of the ma rg i na l  pr i nc i p le  --· of the pr i nc iple  tha t  you can 
have too m uch of a good t h i n g  - i n  gove rn ing the  movements of 
va l ue in a soc ie ty .  Class ica l  u t i l i t a ri an ism ignores this pr inc ip le in 
a ffi rm i ng ,  ll a t l y ,  tha t t he genera l u t i l i t y  of g i ven  fee l ing-d i sposi t i ons 
w i l l  gua ra n tee thc i r h igh e t h ica l  va l ue .  For i t  thereby fa i l s  to accoun t  
for t he  ca ses where , p rec i se l y a s  a resu l t  o f  s u ch  h igh va l ua t ion ,  a 
gi ven fee l i ng-<l ispos i t ion  is rep l i ca ted to the e xtent  where i t  begi ns to 
ha ve nega t i ve conseq uences for the common good . For Eh renfe l s ,  i n  
con t ras t : 
On ly t hose d i sposi t i ons  a re val ued h 1gh l y  for wh ich an  increase i n  the 
fac t u a l l y  e x i s t i ng s toc k  would be such as  t o  promote the genera l  good 
(p . 4 38 ) .  
On l y  those fee l i ng-d ispos i t i ons a re va l ued h igh ly  for wh ich the 
1 4 . Va l ucs ,  for Eh renfe l s ,  e i ther exist or do not cx i s t : t hey cannot be t rue
or fa l se .  He does however recognise certa i n  sorts of error of va/uation. The 
va l ue of q uack remedies ,  for exa rn ple .  cornes in to  be ing on ly t h rough the 
med i a t i on  of a fa lse j udgrnen t about an  object . He recogn ises a l so the 
poss ibi l i t y  of ma k i ng a fal se j udgment  about  a va l ue ,  e . g . ,  when someone 
a ssumes ,  i ncorrec t ly ,  that he k nows wha t i s  best for another . Cf. System der
Werttheorie , Pa rt 1 ,  Ch . I X  a nd Pa rt I I ,  Ch . VB .  A fu l l  t reatment of these 
ma tters would requi re a deta i led comparison of Eh renfels' views wi th those 
of Bren tano ( 1 889), for whom the role of (correct and i ncorrect)judgmenr i n  
t he t heory of va l ues  is much more prom i nen t .  
. 1 • 
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demand i s  grea tc r than the  s upp ly ,  a nd a l a rge pa rt o f  Ehrenfe l s '  
e thics i s  conce rncd w i th  the soc ia l  'regu lators' which st im u late 
i nd i vidua l s  to opt imal  l eve ls  of p roduct ion of feel i ngs such as gui l t , 
regret , compassion , caut ion , enthusiasm , and the l ike . 
§ 10 .  Va lue and Habi t
Eh ren fe ls '  account of the evol u t i on  of va lues rests on a d i st i nction
between I .  cultural development , i .e .  t he accum ulat ion of products of 
ma ter ia l  and i n t e l lect u a l  l ahour ,  o r  of cap i t a l  in the widest sen se , 
inc luding acqui red h uman capi ta l ,  a n ,  la nguage , re l ig i on , l aw,  
trad i t ions  of ch i ld -rea ri ng ,  e tc . , and  2 .  cons ti t u t i ve de velopment ,  i . e .  
the evolu t ion  of i nborn phys i ca l  and psych ica l  characteri s t ics of  the  
organ i sm . 1 5  l t  i s  one pri nc i pa l  theme of Eh renfe ls '  later wr i t i ngs that  
cu l tu ra l  evo l u tion  may have a nega t ive effect on const i tut i ve evol u­
tion (cf. Graß l ,  1 982a ,  pp. J 3ff. ) .  l t  i s  not  t hi s  aspect of Ehrenfe ls '  
t hought wh ich i s  of i n te res t  t o  us he re ,  however, bu t  ra ther the detai ls 
of the wavs i n  wh ich , on h i s  account ,  c u l t u ra l  and const i tu t i ve fac to rs 
i n te ract  � i th  each  other in 1he indi vidual subject. We shal l  seek 
spec i fi ca l l y  to a nswer the quest ion as to how the ind ivid ual can 
acq u i re or l earn to perce i ve cu l t u ra l  va lues  as va l ues at  a l l .  
Before we  ca n a n swcr  t h i s  q ue st i on , however,  a nother de tour i s  
necessa ry , i n  orde r tha t  we may set  forth the out l ines of a stra in  of 
Herba rt i a n i sm i n  Eh ren fe l s '  t h i nk ing .  Herba rt concei ved the m ind as 
consist i ng ,  i n  effect , of two lcve ls :  a s t rict l y  confined level of 
consciousness , and a deeper ,  sub-conscious leve l ,  wit h i n  wh ich i t  i s  as 
i f  there i s  un l i rn i ted space and freedom of movemen t . 1 6  Elements a re 
excha nged cont i n uous l y  between the  t wo leve l s ,  thei r passage gov­
erned by q uasi-mechan ical l aws of a t t ract ion and repulsion ( ' l aws of 
1 5 . As wi l l  become clear, there is much in Eh renfels' wri t i ngs to suggest
t he fu rther d i s t inc t i on .  cmphas i sed by Hayek ( 1979) ,  between l (a ) . cu l tural 
va l ues which a re the prod uct of  del ibera te huma n  c reation or design , for 
example the va lue of an e lec t ro-t u rb ine ,  a nd l (b) .  cu l t u ral val ues which e xis t  
a s  a resu l t  of human act ion bu t  a s  i t s  unintended consequences. Not 
everyth ing tha t is not  n a t u ra l  is therefore a lso 'a rtific ia l '  i n  the normal sense 
of this word . 
1 6. lt may be worth point ing out here that Herbart had a no less powerfu l
influence on the th ink i ng of Freud. 
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associa t ion ' )  a nd subject to different sorts of forces a nd pressu res 
( ' i n h ibi t i o n ' ,  's uppression ' ,  e tc . ) .  
The deta i l s  of Herbart 's v i ew need not , fortunate iy ,  concern us  
here . The version wh ich Eh renfe ls  accepted was,  i n  a ny case, toned 
down by elements of the rather more soph is t icated act-psychology of 
Brentano .  The fol lowing passage from the  System der Werttheorie 
wi l i , however ,  gi ve a flavour of the view in quest ion:  
Jmmed i a te l y a fter we recei ve a vivid impressi on .  the image of the lauer 
floats before us wi th grea t dari iy , a nd even i f  i !  is for a t ime suppressed 
from our consciousness th rough subsequent  experiences, s t i l l , i t  reassert!'. 
i tsel f  wi thout any exert ion on our pa rt a s  soon as there is, so to speak ,  a 
free space - somewhat as a submerged p iece of wood wi l l  rise to t he 
su rface of wa ter as soon as one !eaves it to i tsel f  (p . 34 1 f. ) 1 7 
Let us assume, if only for the sake of argument , that there is at least 
somc g ra in  of t ruth i n  what Herbart , Ehrenfels ( and Freud) have to 
say i n  t h is a nd si m i lar passages about tbe 'narrowness of conscious­
ness' (Enge des Bewußtseins] .  What is the relevance of th is notion to 
our  presen t concerns? Act ions  normal ly  take pl ace only to the extent
that t here a re assoc ia ted desi res (acts of s triv rng and wil l ing). But
such des i res ,  together wi t h  the presenta t ions which they i n voive and
t he fee l i ngs w i th  which they may be associated, take up ,pace, to the
ex tent  tha t  t h e  execut ion of even a relat ive ly  unsoph ist icated system
of act ions wou ld he imposs ib le  if  the presenta t ions and desires
associated wi th  each of i t s  various component  paits would have to
remain  in consciousness s imu ltaneously .  The na rrowness of cons­
ciousness wouid secm to imply that i t  would be poss ible for man to
form desires re la ting on!y to re!a t i ve !y simple tasks ,  ordercd at best in
a l inear fashion, leav ing no scope for the nesti ng of cnds and means,
for practice and rehearsal , for planning or preparation in advance .
How, t hen , can thc somet i mes massively complica ted systems of
higher order act ions characterist ic of l ife i n  developed societ ies come
about  at a l l?
l t  w i l l  no t  suffice to seek a sol ut ion to this problem by point ing to
wha t might be ca l led a division of the labour of desire i n  society 
(though such certa in l y  exists ) ,  for there are many h igher-order actions 
which involve one i nd ividual  only, and even in cases of collect ive 
act ion the problem would rema i n  of giving an  account - other than 
by an appea l to some k i nd of pre-establ i shed harmony - of how the 
1 7. The passage occurs in the context of a discussion of Herbart's t heory . 
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respecti ve des ires of the part ic ipat ing subjects  should ret lculate wi th 
each other in just the wa ys which are necessary to yield the 
appropriate results .  
Ehrenfels' solution to th is  problem consi sts in the idea that even 
com plex  systems of h igher order act ions, as they man i fest themselves 
in the l ife  of the ind ividual , a re broken down into const i tuen t ,  
rela t i ve l y  rout ine tasks, in such a way that the desi res necessary to 
call forth each part icu lar task i n  the appropria1e context enter in to  
consciousness a utomatica l l y .  Thi s  comes about i n  v i rtue of  the fac t 
t hat the objects whose rea l isa t ion is t he goal of the g iven const i t uem 
micro-act ions have become , i n  d iffe ren t  wa ys, stamped with vai ue i n  
the i r  own righ t .  Or more precise l y ,  s ince for Eh renfels va lue is i tself 
just  the reiat ion of desi rabi l i t y  of an object  for a subjec t ,  the subject 
h imse l f  becomes affected in such a way that des i re for the rea l i sa t ion 
of the g iven 0bject ar i ses automatica l l y  wi th in  h i rn ,  w i thout  h i s  
having to recai l  or work ou t  rat iona l l y  in each succe.:;s ive i nstance 
why it is that he  fi nds the g i ven obj ect  va l uable . 
The mechanisms by which the subjcct is a ffected in  the re levan t  
wa ys a re certain highly spec i fic fee l ing-di sposit iom, 'wh ich enab!e us  
to ca rry through a system of  act ions once started with rela t ively l i t t l e  
expense of prescntat ional act i vi t y  in our des iri ng' (p . 372). These a re
portmantcau fee l i ng-dispos i t ions, eff ect 1ve ,  i n  principle, in re lation to 
a l l  sphe res of l i fe ,  d i sposi t ions wh ich we have just because we are 
norma ! i y  deve loped act ing ,  desiring subjects .  Tirns ,  a t  least wi th in 
certain l im i t s .  we possess a d isposi t ion to fee l  more comfortable in 
doing what we have done before (the mechanism of habitualion ). We 
possess a d i sposi t ion to feel uneasiness at a n  interruption of a system 
of act ions once in i tiated ,  or a t  the giving up of a decision once 
made . 1 8  h is  as a resu l t  of these and related dispositions that objects 
which we have once conceived as means towards some desi red goa l 
thereby qu ick ly  acqu i re the characterist ic of goods i n  the ir  own right .  
Tims w e  are spa red the constant regard t o  t h e  end-resu l t  o r  u l t ima te 
goa l of our  act ions ,  or indeed to any goal at all. In the course of the 
1 8 .  The paral le l suggests itse lf between these phenomena and the pheno­
mena of t ime-preference and risk-aversion discussed by econom ists (and in 
particular by the members of t he Austrian school ) .  All the given disposi tions 
occur to different degrees in  different  individuals , and in different types and 
classes of individua l .  All can be affected by (and have an effect on the 
success of) education and training. 
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exccu t ion of the overwhe lming majority of our  act ions we procecd 
mechanically. 
The s t uden t .  for example ,  does not need to reca l l ,  as he buys h i s  tra in 
t icke t  a t  t h e  s ta t ion , that he is doi ng th i s  because i t  is necessa ry to reach 
the mounta in s ;  he has a l ready q ua l i tied the t icket -· or the possession of 
lt -- as  a 'good ' in  t he  cons idera t ions which preceded his decision. And 
he desirt"s 1 h is good , now. for as long as the gi ven considera t ions a re not 
pu t  ou t  of ac t ion - not a s  mean s .  but as end , jus t  as he desires the v iew 
from t he moun l a i n s  (p . 373). 
Where we imagine that a given system of act i ons is running its 
course i n  a way which i m pl ies chat i t  i s  coord ina ted by a determ ined 
ego or se i f. characterised by resol u t ion a nd si ngle-mindedness , there 
i s  i n  fact  a cont inuous and somewhat haphazard swicch ing of desi re 
from end-resu l t  to  med ia t e  goa l ,  from presen t  act ion to subsequent 
act i on .  in terspe rsed , for the fa r grea ter  part of the t ime (or i ndeed, i n  
ca scs of total rou t i n i sa t i on ,  usurped en t i re ly) , by per iods wi t hout any 
sort of des i re a t  a l l .  And wc can he reby perha ps beg:in  to understand 
how i t  i s  poss i bie tha t  the specific ma teria l d ispos i t ions appropna te 
to gi ven  h igher order act ions shou ld  become inscribed on the 
i nd i vid ual , and how the  a ssocia ted systems of cu l t ura l  va l ues shou!d 
come into be i ng and should thereafter be prese rved a nd respected . 
Consider ,  fo r cxam ple , t he  complex  networks of va l ues wh ich are 
i n vol ved i n  t he respect we have for good manners ,  or for good 
grammar .  or for legal  or po l i t ica l or rel igious inst i tu t ions .  or in our 
concern to go about our  da i ly tasks i n  an  honest  and d i l igen t  fashion . 
lhe d i sposi t ions to fee l i ng which these va! ues reflect a re not .  except 
in a vanish i ngl y sma l l  degree ,  i nna te ;  and nor a re they acqu i red as a 
resu l t  of ra t ional i nsigh t  on the part of mdividuals into the truth or 
fals i ty of given laws or ma xims .  Ra ther ,  they are the cum ula t ive 
efTects of the workings of mechanisms of ha bituat ion , etc . , of the 
k i nd referred to above . 1 9
Of  course , i n  the  vast  majori ty of  cases ,  t hese mechanisms are 
brought i n to pla y and the relevant d i sposi t ions t hereby become 
19 . Many of t he ideas in th i s  sect ion wi l l  be found , in  different  fonns, in
Hayek ,  1 962, which rests in  turn on Hayek ,  1 952. They can be detected a l so 
in the t h i nk i ng of Hume, for whom of cou rse the not ion of habil p layed a 
cen t ra l  role , not leas t  in h i s  concept i on of t he  work ings of pol i t ical and 
rel igious inst i t u t ions .  (See Ehrenfe l s ,  1 8 8 7, pp . 5 54 , 576, ) 
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inscr ibed on t he  subject as a resul t  of thc fact  that  a n  ind ividua l is i n  
the fi rst place constra ined by another to execute a gi ven h igher order 
act ion against his will. Indi viduals acq u i re cu l t u re above all through 
t ra i n i ng and ed uca t ion . But  to describe the complex i n terplay of 
va l ue and fee l ing which is at work i n  th i s ,  necessari ly col lective or 
co l l a bora t i ve process, would lead us far  too fa r afield . 
§ 1 L Conc l us ion
This b rief out l ine has .  I ho·pe ,  b rought ou t  three cent ra l  features of
Ehrenfe l s '  work on val ue theory : 
1 .  i ts nat u ra l i sm and descri pt i ve dept h :  Eh renfel s makes no as­
sumpt ion that need be rcgardcd a s  implausible by any h u man  science ; 
2 .  1 t s  appea l  to struuure , to dependenc� rela t ions and ca usa l 
re!a t ions , above a l l  i nvolvmg ac t s  a nd d i spos i t ions t o  ac t ;20 
3 .  i t s  sensi t i v i t y to the rela t iona i  charac ter of va ! ue s ,  which is  
man i fested in a wa y wh ich leaves room for a power on the  part of 
ind iv iduals to determ inc va l ues - wi t hout however co l laps ing i nto 
mere re la t i vism or scepticism , 
20. Dcpendence rela t ions or relat ions of inseparabi l i ty hold ing across
t ime are inadmissible w i th in the framework of Brentano's own descriptive 
psyrhology , which is in th is respect in ferior to that of Eh renfels :  sec the 
cr i t ica l rema rks  appended to Mu l ! igan/Sm i t h ,  1 985 .  
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